

**PRIVATE SECURITY GUARDS OR SECURITY AND CIVIL PROTECTION
WORKERS AS FUTURE GUARANTORS OF SAFETY IN ELEMENTARY
SCHOOLS**

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Abstract: After the latest incident at the Prečko elementary school, the level of security in elementary schools has once again become a priority security and social issue in the Republic of Croatia. Under pressure from parents and the general public, who, under the impression of the aforementioned incident, demanded strict supervision of elementary school buildings, the city of Zagreb, Pula and several other local communities hired security guards at the entrances to school buildings. However, immediately after the incident itself, doubts arose from the line ministry and several actors involved in the aforementioned issue, as to whether private security guards in schools are a sufficiently adequate and optimal solution. Following the above, in order to provide an argumentative explanation of the aforementioned dilemma, we will attempt to analyze possible threats and dangers in elementary schools, as well as the proposed security measures proposed by the ministry. In addition to the above, the subject of analysis will also be the protective activities of licensed security guards in accordance with their legal authorities, in proportion to future security and civil protection employees, in the capacity of new security officers in elementary schools proposed by the line ministry.

Keywords: Elementary schools – level of security – threats – security guards/security and civil protection workers

1. INTRODUCTION

As we emphasized after the latest tragic event in the Prečko elementary school, which shocked the entire Croatian public, the issue of the level of security in elementary schools has once again come to the forefront as a logical topic. While numerous actors expressed their opinions on the aforementioned level of security (both positive and negative), the majority of parents and the wider public were strongly impressed and somewhat shocked by the manner in which the attack in question was carried out, as well as the tragic consequences of the loss of a young child's life. A partially reassuring fact was that the attack itself occurred at the end of the first semester, followed by a two-week break until the beginning of the second semester, which gave a certain amount of time to assess the overall security situation and take any security measures in elementary school buildings. However, despite the passage of the aforementioned time, as well as emphasizing that this was an isolated case that could not have been predicted,

parents were very clear in their positions, threatening not to send their children to school if they were not guaranteed a minimum level of security. The same implied supervision of the entrances to/from school institutions with the aim of preventing a similar case from happening again in another school. The Ministry of Science, Education and Youth proposed the measure of locking the entrance doors, while parents requested the services of professional security guards at the entrances to school buildings. As a result of the above, professional security guards were hired for all primary schools in the cities of Zagreb and Pula at the entrances to primary schools. However, immediately upon the announcement of the aforementioned engagement, calculations were made with the stances "are security guards really the optimal solution in schools...?", and proposals were made that one position would be foreseen within the school systematization for persons with special qualifications related to security tasks. As a result of the above, for the current security policy we have obtained two possible security task performers (licensed security guards) and a newly established position of operational employee for security and civil protection tasks. While for the former we know the possible scope of work within the framework of legal powers, for the latter we are only now defining the work tasks within the framework of the school systematization and adopting the curriculum for the training of the aforementioned personnel. In addition to the above, it is necessary to emphasize that school facilities (so far) have not been the subject of a serious analysis of potential dangers, threats and vulnerabilities, which are necessary for each school to analyze in the assessment of vulnerability, on the basis of which an optimal and effective protection plan would be proposed. Following the above issues, within the framework of this paper we will try to shed light on the circumstances of the actual state of security in elementary schools, potential threats and hazards, as well as optimal protection measures in the function of an adequate security response to them, regardless of who ultimately implemented the aforementioned security tasks. Private security in elementary schools has its continuity, logical application, as well as positive experiences from numerous countries in the region, but unfortunately it has not had regular funding, which we believe will be guaranteed in the future at least through a newly established job position within the school systematization. However, even with the aforementioned guarantee of a regular investment cycle, the relevant job position and the direct executors of security tasks at it still need to be organized, their work optimized in terms of content and security, so that they can become a truly permanent solution to the aforementioned security issue in the future. Drawing on the above, the research question of this paper logically arises in the context of the question... "Are operational security and civil protection workers really the future guarantors of safety in elementary schools?"

2. ATTACK AT PREČKO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL

... on 20.12.2024. in the morning hours (around 9.50 a.m.) a knife attack occurred at an elementary school in the Zagreb neighborhood of Prečko:

- the attacker was a 19-year-old man,
- several people were injured in the attack
- the injured teacher suffered 31 stab wounds...
- a seven-year-old child was killed in the attack

3. DANGERS, THREATS AND HAZARDS IN ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS

Considering that we will deal with the 'vulnerability assessment and risk analysis in primary school buildings' in more detail in a separate paper, within which we will comment on risks in relation to property, dangers, threats, vulnerabilities and consequences in the school buildings themselves, for the purposes of this paper we will concentrate only on a part of the dangers, threats and vulnerabilities (from the total register) for which direct and immediate protective activity is expected, either by a licensed security guard and/or an operational worker for security and civil protection (hereinafter referred to as 'operational worker').

In this context (with a parallel review of the event itself at Prečko Elementary School), it is certainly worth highlighting...

Table 1. Presentation of some of the dangers, threats and vulnerabilities in school buildings

DANGERS	THREATS	VULNERABILITIES
1. Unlocked main entrance door of the school 2. The possibility of entering without control through other doors and other entrances 3. Unclosed windows on the ground floor 4. Unauthorized entry of persons 5. Incidents related to the violent behavior of students/parents of students 6. Conflicts among students 7. Conflicts between parents of students or staff 8. Damaging or destroying school property (vandalism) 9. Threats with weapons, tools or explosives 10. Attacks by violent or mentally unstable individuals 11. Attacks on the school by unknown persons 12. Set fire 13. Terrorist attacks ...	1. Unauthorized entry by a third party 2. Violent/inappropriate behavior by students 3. Violent/inappropriate behavior by parents of students 4. Violent/inappropriate behavior by teaching staff 5. Threats to teaching staff by students and/or parents 6. Threats to teaching staff by third parties 7. Threats with weapons, tools or explosives 8. Threats to teaching staff or students by violent or mentally unstable individuals 9. Murder 10. Bodily injuries 11. Disturbance of public order and peace in the school yard 12. Terrorism 13. Robbery ...	1. Failure to lock the front door and other doors to enter the school 2. Malfunctioning lock on the front door or other doors to enter the school 3. Unsupervised control of physical access to the school building 4. Lack of physical protection of buildings, doors and windows 5. Insufficient security training 6. Students/employees 7. Unprotected school yard 8. High crime area 9. Lack of security protection plans 10. Lack of regular security checks 11. Lack of awareness and measures to protect the building 12. Unmarked evacuation route from the building 13. Failure to conduct evacuation training for students and employees ...

Source: Authors

4. PROPOSAL OF SECURITY MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE RELEVANT MINISTRY

The Ministry of Science, Education and Youth (mainly) in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior has proposed a series of measures for action in school institutions in cases of various threats in the form of guidelines, protocols, instructions and other forms. The main goal of the aforementioned guidelines is stated to be "prevention of various dangerous situations that may endanger students and school employees in any way" (MSEY, 2023). For example, among other activities, the ministry suggests to schools that:

- in all situations of direct and imminent danger to the life, body and safety of students or employees of the school institution, immediately request the intervention of the police
- in cases of threat of self-harm, request the intervention of the police and emergency medical services
- a student who is caught committing a criminal offense or under circumstances indicating that he has committed a criminal offense in the vicinity of the school institution, school institution employees may and should detain until the police arrive (referring to the institution of civil arrest, "...everyone may prevent the escape of a person caught in a criminal offense who is being prosecuted ex officio..." from Article 106 of the Criminal Code).
- as well as in a specific case of suspicion of the commission of a punishable act (school institution employees) preserve and secure traces/evidence that are with the student or in the

school institution until the police arrive so that they are not destroyed, altered or taken away. (Guidelines for the conduct of school institutions in cases of threats with unwanted consequences, MSEY, 2023).

As a result of the above, the unfortunate incident from the Prečko elementary school would certainly fit into the first of the prescribed guidelines for action. In the specific case, the same was respected (... given that the police were informed about the attack at the school), but unfortunately the recommendation of the ministry in the aforementioned guideline does not ensure any effective protective activity, which would have prevented the potential threat and therefore prevented it in a timely manner. In line with the above, the data obtained from the analysis of the aforementioned events in Europe and the USA statistically show that, as a rule, "attacks in school institutions occur within three minutes, and it usually takes up to seven minutes for the police to arrive" (Šprem, 2025). Regarding the microlocation of the attack itself, research shows that 'violent behavior of students (or parents) is most often realized during class, during recess in the school corridor and in the teacher's office (cabinet, meeting room)' (Radić Bursać, Kovčo Vukadin, Rattinger, 2023). Based on the above, it is realistic to conclude that for any effective protection measures, we must have a direct security officer who can react immediately in the school institution. However, ultimately, this is also the biggest problem with the relevant acts adopted by the ministry, which are in principle acceptable, logical, and cover a large part of possible security issues, but unfortunately the guidelines for acting in the above cases remain at the level of a set of good wishes and expectations that someone will, by timely reporting on a potentially crisis situation, both endanger and prevent it.

In addition to the above, it is worth noting, for example, that the aforementioned guidelines for action ... were adopted by the ministry on 18.05.2023, after the massacre at the V. Ribnikar Elementary School in Belgrade, which occurred on 03.05.2023, during which 9 children and 1 security guard were killed by students of the aforementioned school, and 6 people were injured (Hina, 2025). From the aforementioned context, it is clear that although we had the opportunity to testify about an unprecedented crime in an elementary school, in a neighboring country (with a not so different mentality), despite this, we did not take any more concrete steps in the context of creating (real) conditions for preventing the aforementioned and similar forms of threats in school facilities in the Republic of Croatia, in such a way that we created conditions that the cases in question could be prevented by the actions of a trained person within the school itself, but we relied (only) on the usual calling of the police in the case of similar incidents. Let us recall that the aforementioned school in Belgrade also had a security guard at the entrance, who succumbed to gunshot wounds from a 13-year-old perpetrator. Likewise, when analyzing the aforementioned event, of course, among other comments, the thesis that it was an unprecedented, unexpected, extraordinary, isolated, etc. event was also present... Epithets that in a security context often suggest the fact of unpredictability, indefensibility, and therefore the impossibility of preventing it. And then, on the fateful 20.12.2024., with similar epithets and explanations, we witness the attack at the Prečko elementary school in Zagreb, during which a 19-year-old attacker killed one child and injured 6 people. (DNEVNIK.hr, 2024).

Unfortunately, we witnessed a bestial attack by a mentally disturbed young man with a tragic outcome. However, it is a partial consolation that this is the first fatal attack in an elementary school since the attack in Zadar in 1971, when a 19-year-old high school graduate also shot and killed two teachers (Sviličić, 2023). However, it is also an attack that could not have been avoided in any way, given that there was no one to prevent it in the given circumstances. The very manner in which the aforementioned act was carried out, as well as the age of the victim, horrified the entire public in the Republic of Croatia, and especially the parents who had to send their children to school (again) after the holidays. The public pressure was simply too great and demanded some urgent intervention to restore confidence in the deteriorated state of security, which was articulated through the statement 'that without security guards, children will not return to school'. (Dnevnik/HRT, 2024). The relevant ministry established a broad working group and after a few days produced the Protocol on the control of entry and exit in school institutions, which again had as its main goal the provision of greater security in school institutions..., the protection of students and all workers in school institutions, and the prevention of possible situations of increased risk. And while the ministry spent over 10 days dealing with the type and quality of the locks on the entrance doors of school institutions, with parallel complaints about the engagement of professional security guards in elementary schools, we can summarize the key recommendations of the Ordinance in question, through measures to:

- the school entrance door should be locked,
- during recess/breaks, students are not allowed to leave the school premises
- that the school is obliged to designate a worker on duty at the entrance during working hours, who is obliged to:
 - check the identity of the person entering the school institution by inspecting the ID card
 - meet the parent/client (...who can enter the school only with prior notice or at the school's invitation) at the entrance and after the meeting, escort the parent/client from the school
 - in order to protect safety (may) perform security checks: of students/other persons and their belongings (clothes, bags, etc.) entering the school. (Protocol on entry and exit control in school institutions, MSEY, 2024).

There have been similar activities in the segment of protection and protection of the rights of students themselves in previous years, such as the Regulations on the manner of conduct of educational workers of school institutions in undertaking measures to protect the rights of students and reporting any violation of these rights to the competent authorities (MSEY, 2013), the Protocol on Procedure in Cases of Violence among Children and Youth (MSEY, 2004), etc. However, for all the aforementioned activities over the years, as well as the latest proposed measures that were already implemented in a large part of school institutions, the ministry continued to rely mainly on school and extracurricular staff within the schools themselves, who are neither trained (nor have formal authority), and often are not even physically able (given that the aforementioned tasks are performed mainly by cleaners, janitors and janitors) to undertake the aforementioned actions. Thus, in addition to the key measures of mandatory school locking, more secure types of school doors, locks, etc., the notion that school

systematizations would include a position for persons with special qualifications related to security began to emerge, thus creating the notion of an operational security and civil protection worker, who would not be a security guard but would have certain skills related to security.

5. PROTECTIVE ACTIVITIES OF LICENSED SECURITY GUARDS

As we emphasized with the recommendations from the Regulations issued by the relevant ministry, the city of Zagreb, Pula (and several cities that already had security guards engaged in schools, such as Zadar, Dubrovnik, Ivanić Grad, etc.) began the second semester with the engagement of professional security guards at the entrances to school buildings. Of course, the engagement of security guards in question was primarily aimed at preventing any similar event such as the attack on the Prečko Elementary School. Therefore, it is necessary to view the engagement in question as a certain firefighting measure after the aforementioned tragic event, taking into account the psychological effect itself (along with all other functionalities of private security) that was intended to be achieved by the aforementioned engagement, primarily through the expected functional aspect of monitoring the entry/exit of persons into/out of the school premises, i.e. the control and prevention of the entry of all persons who may in any way endanger the safety of children (in the now protected area) of elementary schools. Therefore, the basic assumption of the aforementioned engagement (as well as a kind of guarantee of safety for anxious parents) is contained in the fundamental powers of the security guard to prevent the entry of a person (...student, parent, and any third party) into the school premises with a cold, firearm and/or any other weapon suitable for causing injuries to students, teachers and other school staff. The reality of the aforementioned actions is guaranteed precisely by the legal powers of the security guard, who can at any time prevent the entry into the protected area of a person who has a weapon or tool suitable for causing injuries, as well as repel (with the use of coercive means) an attack on himself or the person he is protecting, articulated by a potential perpetrator (Perčin, 2025).

However, as we mentioned, the total engagement of security guards at the beginning of the second semester after the attack at Prečko Elementary School was limited to monitoring (unlocking/locking) the entrance doors to school buildings, which is truly an elementary useful

In accordance with Article 45 of the Private Protection Act, the powers of persons who have been issued a permit to perform bodyguard duties are:

1. verifying the identity of persons
2. issuing warnings and orders
3. temporarily restricting freedom of movement
4. inspecting persons, objects and means of transport
5. securing the scene
6. using means of coercion.

Means of coercion are:

- physical force,
- sprays of permitted harmless substances,
- means of restraint (handcuffs or other suitable means),
- security dog
- firearms.

measure, of all the measures and actions that a security guard has within the framework of his legal powers in accordance with the Private Security Act (OJ 16/20, 114/22).

Therefore, precisely because of the aforementioned reality and the initial speculations about the adequacy of the engagement of licensed security guards in question, as well as the engagement itself as a temporary solution (until the training and employment of operational staff...), it is realistic to conclude that by deciding on the 'in-house' model of security activities (with executors within the school systematization), no one has really addressed the positive experiences, practices and security activities of private security guards in EU countries where they regularly and daily perform security tasks in school institutions.

6. SCOPE OF WORK OF THE OPERATIONAL OFFICER FOR SECURITY AND CIVIL PROTECTION

As we emphasized in the introduction, immediately after the attack at the Prečko Elementary School, and the parents' requests for the engagement of security guards at the entrances to the schools (as a kind of guarantors for restoring the broken trust in the security of the aforementioned facilities), a rather negative attitude towards the (then possible) engagement of security guards was articulated in parallel, in the form of statements 'that security guards are not the solution', 'that we have negative experiences with security guards', etc. Since the stated attitude came from the highest officials of the relevant ministry, immediately after the first statements about the aforementioned event and the measures that are planned to be taken (in order to prevent the same and similar tragedies in the future), the thesis of 'an employee within the school system who will have certain knowledge and skills in the field of security' emerged. So, practically from the first day after the aforementioned event, we have had an alternative form of performing security tasks in schools, for which only the content was later required to be adequate (which would be different from private security work), and yet satisfy the necessary functional purpose of protection and necessary protective activities in schools (Perčin, 2025). In the aforementioned process, a new function of 'operational worker for security and civil protection' was also created, which was added as a new job position within the Ordinance amending the Ordinance on the scope of work of the secretary and administrative-technical and auxiliary tasks performed in primary schools (OJ 71/2025), within which his tasks are prescribed in Art. 6. a...

The operational officer for security and civil protection performs the following tasks:

- supervises access control to the school facility, supervises and secures school property and premises,
- participates in the organization and implementation of basic civil protection measures and performs maintenance tasks for the school building and its environment,
- cooperates with the competent services (fire brigade, emergency services, civil protection) in case of emergencies,
- participates in education and raising awareness of students and employees about security protocols and procedures in emergency situations,
- monitors situations in school premises and reports to the competent persons behaviors that may endanger the safety and well-being of students, employees and visitors,
- cooperates with educational and other workers and the school principal in providing support for the safety and well-being of students,
- performs other security and civil protection tasks arising from the annual school work plan and program and other regulations.

Likewise, given that most of the objections to the engagement of security guards in proportion to the new operational employees (along with the very permanence of engagement in school facilities) related to the level of education, or rather to the new dimension and scope of education that the aforementioned operational employees will have, which will be significantly greater and more comprehensive in content than the training for security guards themselves, upon reviewing the list of operational employee tasks, we cannot help but notice that in the final formulation of the tasks, a number of initial proposals and expectations of what this person would ultimately do were abandoned, and that the adopted amendments to both Regulations (...for primary schools and secondary schools) differ significantly from the Draft Proposal for the Regulations, which were the subject of a public discussion at the e-Consultation (Blažinović Grgić, 2025). However, despite the above, in the end, the specific work tasks were defined very briefly, generally and at the level of elementary actions and security tasks. In addition to the above, it is not known at this time under what authority (and from which law) the aforementioned operational employee will perform the prescribed work tasks.

However, what has become a little clearer (but has also opened up numerous additional questions) is the Education Program for the Acquisition of Partial Qualifications of Operational

- Secondary education
- Croatian citizenship
- Residence in the Republic of Croatia
- Age of majority
- Special mental and physical health ability
- Personal dignity

Security and Civil Protection Officers in Educational Institutions (OJ 70/2025), which, in comparison to the previously described work tasks of an operational security officer in the education program, has taken a significantly broader and more comprehensive approach. For example, in the education program lasting 250 teaching hours, the following competencies are prescribed within the expected sets

of competencies: police officer, security guard, professional communication mediator, teaching assistant, home handyman, which is indeed a large number of expected competencies. On the other hand, as far as the requirements for enrolling in the education program in question are concerned, we have not deviated at all from the requirements themselves (for a licensed security guard), so the requirements in question are:

Furthermore, the subject 'program is implemented by (all) institutions that have registered adult education activities and meet the conditions prescribed by the Adult Education Act and the Program'. However, what is also interesting is the education model itself in which 'learning outcomes are achieved through a guided learning and teaching process in a school/educational institution for 60 hours, through work-based learning for 115 hours, and partly through independent activities of the participants for 75 hours. As a result of the above, we arrive at a very intriguing arrangement of 'modules and sets of learning outcomes' in which the following methods and scopes of education are evident:

Table 2. Modules and sets of learning outcomes

Serial number	MODULE NAME	LIST OF LEARNING OUTCOME SETS	Level	Volume CSVET	Number of hours			
					VPUP	UTR	SAP	TOTAL
1.	SAFETY AND CIVIL PROTECTION IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS	Basics of development of children and youth of school age	3	1	10	10	5	25
		Basic communication skills and work rules in educational institutions	4	1	10	10	5	25
		Security duties and powers of operational security and civil protection employees in educational institutions	4	6	30	60	60	150
		Basics of technical protection, fire and explosion protection and civil protection	4	1	5	15	5	25
		Basics of self-defense and the use of force	3	1	5	20	0	25
Total				10	60	115	75	250

VPUP – guided learning and teaching process

UTR – work-based learning

SAP – independent activities of students

Source: Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia, 2025.

If we summarize the same, we come to the conclusion that **44%** of work-based training + **30%** of training through independent activities of the participants = results in the fact that **74%** of

the training is done by the candidate more or less alone or in a school where he is the only one involved in security work. More specifically, the modules for:

- protection tasks and OO authority for safety and CP in educational institutions - lasting 100 hours (only 35 hours of OO in this module are trained by someone)
- basics of technical protection, fire and explosion protection and civil protection - lasting 35 hours (only 5 hours of OO in this module are trained by someone)
- basics of self-defense and use of force - lasting 20 hours (only 5 hours of OO in this module are trained by someone)... although in the module in question the OO is expected to acquire skills (apply basic physical strength techniques to overcome a person who is resisting; apply basic techniques for tying a person; apply basic baton striking techniques in accordance with the situation and authority.), and all of the above will be acquired with 5 hours of guided training and 20 hours of training only.

Accordingly, with 74% of the training that the candidate completes alone in a school institution where he is the only one (... and still in the training phase) involved in security matters, it is realistic to ask the question, who mentors him in the training?

7. CONCLUSION

Given that this is a very complex and extremely sensitive issue of security, what we can offer in the form of a conclusion are certain theses for further reflection and finding more optimal solutions for the aforementioned security issue. In this context, it is certainly worth highlighting the worrying reality that the issue of security in school institutions is only addressed after such events, and not systematically and continuously. Regarding the engagement of professional security guards in school institutions, we believe that this is certainly not an optimal solution, but it was a necessary firefighting measure to restore parents' trust in the impaired level of security in school institutions after the aforementioned event in the Prečko Elementary School. Clarifying the aforementioned thesis about the (non)optimality of security guards in school institutions, it refers to the reality of the impossibility of raising the level of protection in the aforementioned facilities solely and solely with the personal engagement of one executive in the security segment, without implementing other measures, actions and forms of private security. Of course, we are referring to the necessary engagement of long-standing ubiquitous technical protection systems. The above opinion about the (non)optimality of a physical enforcer for solving the overall security issue in school institutions equally applies to the future operational employee, who will ultimately perform the same tasks as a licensed security guard, but partly even more difficultly, since he will be left to his own devices and his own (initial and elementary) expertise and professionalism, since the aforementioned cadre of operational enforcers is still being educated and formed. We see the biggest problem in the reality that the operational employee in question, even when trained and employed in a school institution, will be the only security officer in a specific protected facility, without any professional and

professional support, infrastructure, etc., which every licensed security guard within the company in which he is employed actually has. Therefore, the creation of a new job position for an operational employee within the school systematization, along with several advantages (job stability, material rights, expanded education), also has a number of disadvantages, primarily in terms of his/her working status, work organization within the school, the inability to further professional and technical training, necessary professional assistance, support, lack of necessary accompanying security infrastructure, etc. Furthermore, the operational employee's work tasks themselves, in proportion to the powers of a licensed security guard, are significantly smaller, although according to the operational employee's training plan, these powers are even somewhat greater. Therefore, for a concrete assessment and comparison of the same, we will still have to wait for the training of the first candidates in the aforementioned training program, their employment, and the subsequent real implementation of the prescribed work tasks in full. As we have emphasized, the work of operational staff in school facilities requires further correction and/or the adoption of new legal solutions that would prescribe their powers and (probably) additionally adjust the totality of work tasks accordingly, given that, for example, the reasons that primarily led to the engagement of security guards in schools could not be prevented by operational staff with their engagement, according to the current situation, and neither is it (at this moment) in the description of their work tasks... Ultimately, by looking at the total number of operational staff needed for all school facilities in the Republic of Croatia, perhaps the greatest absurdity of the entire procedure is contained in the fact that the majority of personnel for the new job position will be the previous licensed security guards, who, although they were not an acceptable option and an adequate solution..., probably with a few hours of additional training and employment in school institutions, will still become a permanent and comprehensive solution for the security issue in question.

In conclusion, if we were to finally try to answer the research question posed in this paper "are operational security officers and CP really the future guarantors of security in elementary schools?", we could conclude that the aforementioned direct executors of security tasks (through their employment within the framework of school systematization) will finally be provided with the necessary material resources for security tasks in the aforementioned facilities. The same resources due to the lack of which private security is not represented in the Republic of Croatia in the same percentage as in developed EU countries. However, as far as the overall solution to the security issue and the final increase in the level of security are concerned, we believe that the aforementioned operational officers are only a small segment of the solution to the security issue in question, which will have to be addressed much more broadly and comprehensively.

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Pravilnik o dopuni Pravilnika o djelokrugu rada tajnika te administrativno-tehničkim i pomoćnim poslovima koji se obavljaju u srednjoškolskoj ustanovi NN 71/2025.

Pravilnik o načinu postupanja odgojno-obrazovnih radnika školskih ustanova u poduzimanju mjera zaštite prava učenika te prijave svakog kršenja tih prava nadležnim tijelima (NN 132/2013).

Odluka o donošenju Programa obrazovanja za stjecanje djelomične kvalifikacije operativni djelatnik za sigurnost i civilnu zaštitu u odgojno-obrazovnim ustanovama / operativna djelatnica za sigurnost i civilnu zaštitu u odgojno-obrazovnim ustanovama, (NN 70/2025).